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This Work Project investigates the determinants of reelection using data on the 278 
Portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 1976-2009. We implement a logit fixed effect 
model to control for the municipalities’ unobserved characteristics that remain constant over time. 
Political variables, such as the vote share of the incumbent’s party in previous election, the number 
of mayor’s consecutive mandates and abstention rate, are found to be relevant in explaining 
incumbent’s reelection. Moreover, as to the mayor’s individual characteristics, age and education 
contribute to explain reelection prospects. We also provide weak evidence that a higher degree of 
fiscal autonomy increases political turnover and that the good economic prospects of the 
municipality positively affect reelection. Finally, the residents’ level of education and the size of the 
municipal population have an explanatory power on mayor’s reelection. We perform several 
robustness checks to confirm these results.  
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This Work Project investigates, with a logit fixed effect model, the determinants of the 
probability of mayors’ reelection, using a panel of the 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities for 
the period 1976-2009.  
The literature on principal-agent model in political economy is extensive.
1
 The theoretical 
framework on elections and political accountability considers a setting of asymmetric information 
where information on the mayor’s type and/or on the cost of public good is hidden.
2
 In principle, 
reelection represents a powerful tool to discipline politicians, rewarding, with an additional term, 
mayors that have acted in the voters’ interest. Hence, incumbent politicians evaluate the impact of 
policy choices on their reelection prospects.   
The opportunistic behavior of incumbents, who seek to gain electoral support by manipulating 
fiscal policy (e.g. with tax cuts or expenditure increases), has been widely analyzed in literature, 
together with the related topic of electoral business cycles. A quite large branch of research focuses 
on politicians’ behavior in electoral terms, on the factors that can affect reelection chances and, in 
particular, on the impact of economic variables on reelection prospects.  
Recently, much attention has been devoted to the analysis of the probability of reelection at a 
sub-national level due to the advantages offered by a larger sample size and by the greater 
comparability of institutional settings when local elections are taken into account. Moreover, local 
politicians are, in principle, more accountable to citizens with reference to local issues. Indeed, local 
government outputs have a higher visibility and, therefore, citizens can more easily monitor the 
responses of local politicians to their needs.  
                                                             
1
 The monograph of Persson and Tabellini (2002) represents one of the main references for the analysis of political 
economy. The authors suggest the adoption of a unified approach that combines the theory of macroeconomic policy, 
public choice and rational choice in political science in order to deal with agency problems and voters’ preferences 
over economic outcomes and policy. Another relevant source for the analysis of the political economy of good 
government is Besley (2007).     
2 The typical political agency model considers two types of politicians: “good” politicians, whose preferences are 
aligned with those of a representative voter, and “bad” politicians, who derive utility from the rents they extract while 
in office.    
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The choice of Portugal is suitable for this analysis since the Portuguese organization and 
legislative framework make municipal elections in Portugal an interesting and singular case of 
study. First, for the period 1976-2009, no legal term limit was imposed to mayor’s office.
3
 Hence, 
no institutional constraint is active on the probability of reelection for the considered time period. 
Second, election dates are fixed, “defined exogenously from the perspective of local authorities” 
(Veiga and Veiga, 2007) and equal for all the municipalities.
4
 Third, the mayor has a high 
decisional power over the definition and implementation of local policy. Finally, with few 
exceptions, all competences are shared only between municipalities and central government, 
leaving no room for vertical externalities between other levels of local authorities.  
This Work Project analyzes whether political, fiscal, economic and demographic variables, as 
well as mayors’ individual characteristics, make incumbents more likely to be reelected.  
The rest of the Work Project is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
topic. Section 3 describes the Portuguese system, with an overview of the Portuguese political and 
fiscal system. Section 4 reports the methodology used for the analysis, with a focus on the expected 
impact of the explanatory variables on reelection. Section 5 provides the estimation results. Section 
6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on the determinants of reelection mainly focuses on incumbents’ opportunistic 
behavior in electoral years and on the impact of economic variables on reelection chances.  
The importance of economic variables on electoral outcomes was firstly recognized by Key, in 
his study on the responsible electorate (1966), and by Kramer, in his work on the effect of 
macroeconomic fluctuations on voting behavior (1971). Since then, the importance of economic 
determinants of reelection has been confirmed by the literature.  
                                                             
3 The elections of 2005 and 2009 are considered in the analysis because the law of 2005, which limited the terms of 
mayors’ office, started to produce its real effects only since the election date of 2013. 
4 In the considered time period, for all the municipalities, elections occurred in the following dates: 12/12/1976, 
16/12/1979, 12/12/1982, 15/12/1985, 17/12/1989, 12/12/1993, 14/12/1997, 16/12/2001, 09/10/2005, 11/10/2009.  
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Empirical evidence shows that voters are concerned about the mayors’ economic performance. 
According to the so-called “responsibility hypothesis” (Nannestad and Paldman, 1994), incumbents 
are accountable to the voters for past and current economic outcomes.  
Since economic variables are incorporated in the voting function, politicians strive to get 
reelected by manipulating fiscal policy. Hence, a problem of endogeneity is likely to arise. 
Nordhaus (1975), McRae (1977) and Rogoff (1990) provide evidence of “Political Business 
Cycles” (PBC), namely, cycles in macroeconomic variables that are induced by the opportunistic 
behaviors of incumbents in electoral years, and that, therefore, confirm the existence of endogeneity 
in the model.     
As mentioned above, the literature has recently shifted the analysis of electoral outcomes to the 
sub-national level. Most of these studies found evidence that local public revenues and expenditures 
matter for electoral results. Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) found that higher expenditures 
increase the probability for a Brazilian mayor to be reelected or for a candidate of the same political 
party to be empowered as a mayor. Balaguer-Call et al. (2014) showed that, for Spanish municipal 
elections, an increase in local government spending has a positive impact on the chances of 
reelection for local government. 
Studies on reelection prospects also found that several political variables are relevant in 
explaining reelection chances and the winning share of votes. Cassette et al. (2009), using data on 
local elections in France, showed that the number of candidates and national partisan waves, play a 
relevant role on the reelection probability of incumbents and their party’s vote share.  
The relevance of economic and political variables on electoral outcomes has been attested also 
in several studies focusing on Portuguese municipal elections. Veiga and Veiga (2007), using data 
on electoral terms from 1979 to 2001, observed that increases in investment expenditures, in 
election years, and changes in the composition of spending favoring more visible items positively 
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affect the vote share of incumbents.
5
 Martins and Veiga (2013) showed that the municipal economic 
situation matters for local electoral outcomes, consistently with the responsibility hypothesis. 
Furthermore, they observed that Portuguese voters attribute a higher importance to recent economic 
performance, relative to more distant events. Castro and Martins (2011) analyzed the determinants 
of the mayors’ choice to run for an additional term in office. They found that this choice is affected 
by the local economic situation more than by the national and regional economic performance. In 
addition, political variables have a high explanatory power for the mayors’ decision to run for 
another term in office.              
This Work Project innovates the literature on several aspects. First, this is the first study, on 
Portuguese municipal elections, that investigates the determinants of mayor’s reelection. This 
variable is deemed to be the most appropriate measure of electoral outcomes.
6
 Second, we extend 
the time span of the analysis, relative to the other studies on Portuguese municipal elections, in 
order to consider nine election terms.
7
 Finally, we introduce, among the set of economic variables, a 
measure of the degree of fiscal autonomy. 
3. The Portuguese system8 
In the following paragraphs, we provide an overview of the organization and governance of the 
Portuguese municipalities, with an analysis of the Portuguese political and fiscal system.  
                                                             
5 According to the finding of Veiga and Veiga (2007), spending more on “Social Equipment”, “Other” (defined as a 
residual item of the component “Other Building”), “Overpasses, Streets and Complementary works”, and “Rural 
roads” increases the incumbents’ percentage of votes.   
6
 According to Carey et al. (2000), “reelection, rather than vote share or margin of victory, is the ultimate indicator of 
electoral success”, hence, the model analyzing the determinants of reelection better “addresses the gist of 
incumbency advantage”.  
7
 The considered period (1976-2009) includes 10 elections. However, due to the use of lagged values, the first election 
(1976) has been dropped from the analysis. 
8 The sources of the following paragraphs on the Portuguese system are the Ministério das Cidades, Administração 
Local, Habitação e Desenvolvimento Regional, (2004): “Estrutura e funcionamento da democracia local e regional”, 
the Portuguese Constitution, the document of OECD “Better Regulation in Europe: Portugal” (2010) and the websites 




3.1. Local organization  
The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, ratified in 1976, was the result of the Portuguese 
Revolution of 1974 that established democracy ending a 48 years period of dictatorship.
 9
 Hence, 
our analysis spans over the entire period of democratic elections in Portugal. The Constitution 
establishes (art. 6) the existence of a unitary state and recognizes, in the respect of the principle of 
subsidiarity, the autonomy of local authorities and the democratic decentralization of Public 
Administration. The Portuguese local government is disciplined by the title VIII of the Constitution, 
which defines local authorities as territorial legal persons that shall seek to pursue the interests of 
local people. The art. 236 of the Constitution states that local authorities, on the mainland, “shall 
comprise parishes (“freguesias”), municipalities (“municípios”) and administrative regions”.  
The Azores and Madeira archipelagos are autonomous regions with self government institutions and 
own parishes and municipalities. Since the organization, governance and statute of autonomy of the 
two archipelagos uniquely characterize them, it has been decided, for the sake of homogeneity, to 
drop them from the database and, therefore, to focus the analysis only on the municipalities of the 
Continent.  
Several changes in the number and composition of local authorities have occurred since 1976. With 
the institution of the municipalities of Amadora, Odivelas, Vizela and Trofa, the number of 
municipalities on the mainland increased from 274, as of 1976, to the current figure of 278.
10
 Over 
the same period, the number of parishes, 4029 in 1976, decreased by 938 units. The current 
organization of local authorities comprises, therefore, 3091 parishes and 308 municipalities, of 
which 278 on the mainland, 19 in the region of the Azores and 11 in the region of Madeira. On the 
Continent, the administrative regions have not already been instituted and the articulation in 18 
districts, defined in 1835, still represents one of the main territorial subdivisions, although districts 
                                                             
9 Art. 6.1. (unitary state) of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic 
was officially ratified the 25th April of 1976. 
10
 The first local election in Amadora was held in 1979, while in Trofa, Odivelas, and Vizela, in 2001. 
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are not given any policy or administrative competences. Another relevant territorial subdivision, 
widely used for statistical purposes, is the subdivision in NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units 
for Statistics). There are three levels of NUTS: NUTS I includes 3 subdivisions (Portugal 
Continental and the two autonomous regions), NUTS II contains 7 subdivisions (Nord, Center, the 
Region of Lisboa, the Region of Alentejo, the Region of Algarve and the two autonomous regions), 
NUTS III further subdivides the territory in 30 sub-regions. A list of the 278 mainland 
municipalities, classified according to the NUTS subdivision, is provided in Appendix.     
3.2. Local political system  
With reference to the organization of local authorities, the art. 239 of the Constitution 
establishes the existence of an elected assembly with decision making powers and a collegial 
executive body. At the municipal level, the assembly has various competences, including the 
approval, monitoring, and supervision of the activities of the executive body. The municipal 
executive body is the so-called “câmara municipal”, literally Municipal Chamber (the Town 
Council), which is responsible for the supervision of the organization and functioning of municipal 
services. Among other functions, the “câmara municipal” must: execute the resolutions adopted by 
the municipal assembly, manage personnel and assets, supervise the budgeting and accountability, 
grant licenses and support parishes in its territory.  
The “câmara municipal” is made up by a number of members (“vereadores”), ranging from a 
minimum of 5 up to a maximum of 17, in function of the electoral population of the municipality. 
The members are elected through a proportional system of direct election and according to the 
method of D’Hondt. The candidate of the list receiving the highest number of votes is elected as 
mayor, the “presidente da câmara”. The mayor presides over the function and the organization of 
the “câmara municipal”.  
Pursuant to the decree-law n°100/84, the duration of the mayor’s office was extended from three to 
four years, with the aim of ensuring a higher efficacy and a better continuity in the management of 
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local administration. Moreover, no term limit was imposed to the mayors’ office until 2005, when 
the new law on electoral rules imposed the limit of a maximum of 3 consecutive mandates.
11
 
However, the law of 2005 has started to produce its effect only as of 2013, because the legal term 
limits were counted from the election year of 2005. Partly due to the absence of term limits, it was a 
common feature for the Portuguese municipalities to be represented by mayors in charge for 
decades. The cases of Braga and of Vila Nova de Poiares, with 10 consecutive mandates, and the 
cases of Alenquer, Benavente, Castro Verde, Chamusca, Reguengos de Monsaraz, Serpa and Sobral 
de Monte Agraço, with 9, singular cases in the international scenario, illustrate the specificities of 
the Portuguese context.  
The absence of legal term limits until 2005 qualifies the Portuguese system of local government as a 
unique case of study for analyzing the determinants of mayors’ reelection.     
The existence of political parties is recognized by the Constitution (art. 10) “in order to 
contribute to the organisation and expression of the will of the people, with respect for the 
principles of national independence, the unity of the state and political democracy”.  
At the central level the Portuguese political scenario has been dominated by two main political 
parties, both registered in 1975: the Socialist Party, “Partido Socialista” (PS), centre-left wing party, 




3.3. Local finance  
The current structure of local finance is the result of several reforms that have modified, 
since 1976, the legislative framework on local finances. The main reforms occurred in 1979, 1987, 
1998 and 2007 and pursued the objective of increasing local autonomy and ensuring a better 
predictability of total municipal revenues.  
                                                             
11 The term limit was imposed with the law 46/2005, of 29 August.    
12 There are a number of other parties which have been active in different sub-periods, but none of them has ever 
been elected. More details are provided in the Appendix.  
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The local finance law establishes the sources of revenue collection for municipalities and the 
rules for the transfers they are entitled to receive from the central government. Currently, the main 
sources of own revenue collection for the municipalities are: 
 1) Local property tax (IMI – “Imposto Municipal sobre Imóveis”).
13
 It falls on the value of 
properties existing in the municipal area. As of 2012, each municipality can choose the tax rate 
within the range [0.3%-0.5%] for re-evaluated urban properties, and [0.4%-0.8%] for non re-
evaluated ones.
14
 For rural properties, instead, the tax rate is 0.8% for all the municipalities. Figure 
2 shows the changes in the range of values for the tax rates that have occurred since 2003; 
2) Municipal property transfer tax (IMT – “Imposto Municipal sobre a transmissão, a título 
oneroso, do direito de propriedade de bens imóveis”).
15
 It falls on the transaction price of real estate 
property. The progressive tax schedule is imposed by the central government on all municipalities;  
3) Local tax on vehicles (IMV - Imposto Municipal sobre Veículos), i.e. a tax on the registered 
vehicles of the municipal residents. The tax rate is set by the central government and depends on the 
characteristics of the vehicle; 
4) Municipal surcharge on the Corporate Income Taxes (“Derrama”). It can be imposed in a 
range of 0 to 10% of the Corporate Income Tax (IRC) collected by the central government in the 
municipality. 
Apart from “Derrama”, all local taxes are compulsory.  
                                                             
13 The IMI, introduced in 2003 (02/12/2003), replaced the so-called “contribuição autárquica”. 
14 The fiscal value of the property is set by the central government. The evaluation is made by a valuer in accordance 
with the criteria established by the code of IMI (“Códigos do Imposto Municipal sobre Imóveis” – CIMI). 
15




Figure 2: Municipal range of values for the tax rate of the Property Tax (IMI), of the Business Tax (Derrama) and of the Income Tax 
(IRS) and their evolution from 1993. Source: Costa da Silva J., Carvalho A., (2013). 
In addition to the own sources, municipal revenue includes transfers from the central government 
through the municipal funds, financing from the European Union, revenues from the sales of goods 
and services, financial liabilities, and a residual amount of other revenues. Finally, municipalities 
benefit from the right to annually participate to a variable percentage, up to 5%, of the Personal 
Income Tax (IRS) imposed on the municipal fiscal residents. 
 We now briefly characterize the structure of municipal revenues.  
Graph 2 depicts IMI revenue as a percentage of total municipal revenue. This is an indicator 
of the degree of fiscal autonomy because IMI represents the largest share of own municipal entries 
and municipalities can discretionally choose the IMI tax rate within a specific range of values.
16
 
Peralta (2010) provides a theoretical model of political accountability that predicts that more fiscal 
autonomy improves the selection of politicians, and has, therefore, a positive impact on political 
turnover.The graph shows a significant increase, over time, in the range of values for IMI share and 
in the difference between its upper and lower quartiles. These results signal a larger variation, in the 
last years, of the degree of fiscal autonomy across municipalities.  
                                                             
16 Municipalities can also choose, within a certain range of values, the tax rate for Derrama. However, due to the 
relatively low importance of Derrama on municipal revenues, it has been decided to concentrate the share of IMI as a 




Graph 2: Box Plots of IMI revenue as a percentage of total municipal revenues, in the years preceding the last six election years. The 
graph displays the distribution of data based on 5 number summary: lower adjacent value, 25 th percentile (lower hinge), 
median, 75th percentile (upper hinge), upper adjacent value. Source: own elaboration from the data provided by the 
Direção-Geral das Autarquias Locais (DGAL). 
Regarding the expenditure side, the municipal expenditures are ordered by the average size 
of their relative importance as follows: acquisition of capital goods, of which investment is the 
largest amount, personnel expenses, acquisition of goods and services, transfers and subsidies, 
financial liabilities, financial burden, and a residual of other expenditures. The following graph 
depicts Investment as a percentage of all the municipal expenditures. 
 
Graph 3: Box Plots of Investment as a percentage of total municipal expenditures, in the years preceding the last six election years. 
The graph displays the distribution of data based on 5 number summary: lower adjacent value, 25 th percentile (lower 
hinge), median, 75th percentile (upper hinge), upper adjacent value. Source: own elaboration from the data provided by the 
Direção-Geral das Autarquias Locais (DGAL). 
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Finally, current municipal responsibilities are the delivery of local public services in areas 
such as water supply, urban waste disposal and social and cultural facilities. Municipalities also 
issue secondary regulations to enforce national rules in the areas of transport, energy, 
communication, education, urban and rural spatial planning, rural and urban equipment, health, 
housing, social affairs and environment. In addition, they are empowered to deliver licenses in these 
areas and to ensure compliance of citizens and business with the related dispositions (OECD 2010).      
4. Methodology 
The database used is a panel data for the 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 
1976-2009. This period includes 10 elections: 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 
2005, 2009. However, due to the use of lagged values for several regressors of the model, the first 
election date has been dropped from the database. Analogously, for the four municipalities that 
were instituted late, we have considered their second municipal elections (for Amadora in 1981 and, 
for the other three municipalities in 2005) as first time point in the analysis.    
The dependent variable of the model is the individual mayor’s probability of reelection. An 
alternative definition of incumbency refers to the political party instead of the individual. A 
robustness check is performed by setting as dependent variable the probability either for the 
incumbent to be reelected or for a candidate of the same political party to be empowered as a 
mayor. We estimate a logit model with municipal and election fixed effects, to account for 
unobserved municipal heterogeneity and relevant economic, political and institutional context of 
each particular election year.    
One limitation of the analysis is the lack of available data on the economic and demographic 
situation of the municipalities for the first election terms. Hence, we run three separate regressions 
with different time horizons: one for the period 1979-2009, that only uses the available data for the 
whole period; a second one, for the period 1997-2009 with all the control variables available for this 
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larger time span (i.e. “DeltaPPI” “AbstentionRate” and “DependencyRatio”), and a third regression, 
for the restricted time interval, 2005-2009, that uses all the explanatory variables in the database.
17
   
We now detail the explanatory variables used in this study, together with their expected signs.    
4.1. Regressors 
The covariates of the model can be grouped into four categories: political variables, individual 
characteristics of the mayor, socioeconomic and demographic indicators, and economic variables. 
The following table reports, for each variable included in the regressions, the code name, 
description, source and some descriptive statistics. 
Code name Description Obs. Mean St. err. Time period Source Unit  
Dependent variable 
Reelection 
Dummy (1 if the mayor was 
reelected) 






 1) Political variables: 
VoteShareprevious 
Votes share of the incumbent's 
party in previous election 
2434 50,41 0,197 1979-2009 CNE Percentage 
Mandates 
Consecutive mandates of the 
incumbent at election date 






Dummy (1 if left-wing 
mayor's party in previous 
election) 






Dummy (1 if the incumbent's 
party is same as central 
government's) 






Abstention rate at the 
municipal elections 
1654 33,45 0,176 1993-2009 CNE Percentage 
2) Mayor's characteristics: 
Age Incumbent's age 2282 46,09 0,186 1979-2009 DGAI Number 
High_education 
Dummy (1 if the incumbent's 
job surely requires a higher 
education)   






Dummy (1 if the incumbent's 
job surely does not require a 
higher education)   





                                                             
17 For the smallest time periods, we use a random effect model because with the fixed effect option the model would 
have dropped a lot of observations due to all equal values taken by the dependent variable in many municipalities. 
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Code name Description Obs. Mean St. err. Time period Source Unit  
Unknown_education 
Dummy (1 if the incumbent's 
job might require a higher 
education) 






Dummy (1 if the outgoing 
mayor is a resident of the 
municipality) 





3) Socioeconomic and Demographic indicators: 
LnResidentPopulation 
Log of municipal resident 
population 
2480 9,84 0,021 1979-2009 INE Number 
DependencyRatio 
Ratio of residents aged 65 and 
older plus under 15 to those 
aged 15-64 
1384 57,78 0,307 1991-2009 INE Number 
Grossenrolratesec 
Gross enrolment rate in upper 
secondary education 
523 119,02 2,674 2005-2009 INE Percentage 
Artgalleriesbyinh 
Art galleries and other 
temporary exhibition spaces by 
1000 inhabitants 
556 0,1105 0,0045 2005-2009 INE No/inh. 
4) Economic variables: 
L.IMIshare 
IMI revenue as a % of 
municipal revenues (one 
period lagged) 






Investment as a % of 
municipal expenditures (one 
period lagged) 






Change of the per capita 
Purchasing Power Index over 
the term 




UnemploymentRate Unemployment Rate 556 6,67 0,097 2005-2009 INE Percentage 
L.TaxrateNonReevaluated 
Tax rate for non reevaluated 
urban properties as of the year 
preceding the elections. 





The variable “VoteShare” is expected to have a positive impact on the probability of 
reelection.
18
 This variable has been used by Cassette at al. (2003), on French local elections, and 
Veiga and Veiga (2007), on Portuguese mainland municipalities, and both find a positive effect of 
this variable on the incumbent’s percentage of votes in the new election.   
Veiga and Veiga (2007) also obtain that the number of years the mayor has been in office has a 
negative and significant impact on the percentage of votes obtained in the new election. A similar 
result is found by Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008), when analyzing the influence of public 
expenditure on the re-election of Brazilian mayors from 1988 to 2000. Castro and Martins (2011) 
                                                             
18 We consider the mayor’s party at the previous election date, despite the cases of mayors changing their parties 
during the period they have been in charge. 
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also use this variable in their study of the incumbent mayor’s decision to re-run for election, 
obtaining a negative impact. Consistently with the main findings in literature, an increase in the 
variable “Mandates” is expected to reduce her probability of reelection. The expected negative sign 
is likely to incorporate the effect of the “cost of ruling”, defined as the decrease in the “stock of 
popularity” or erosion of support with time.  
Another political variable is the dummy “SamePolParty”. The empirical evidence on the 
expected impact of the political alignment between central and local government is not conclusive. 
Veiga and Veiga (2007) find that, when inflation is high, belonging to the same political party of 
the prime minister decreases the incumbent’s percentage of votes. Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 
(2008) find that the political alignment with the President affects reelection negatively, while the 
political alignment with the State Governor seems not to have any significant effect.  
Finally, abstention rate is used as an inverse measure of the citizens’ involvement in political 
affairs, which is likely to increase competition among politicians. Hence, the variable 
“Abstentionrate” is expected to increase the mayor’s probability of reelection. 
We control for the following individual characteristics of the mayor: age, education and 
residency in the municipality.
19
 Castro and Martins (2011) find that the only individual 
characteristic that has a significant impact on the mayor’s decision to run for another term is age, 
and the effect is negative, consistently with the finding that the probability to run for another term 
decreases with time.  
The third group of variables pertains to the socioeconomic and demographic indicators.
20
  
                                                             
19
 We construct a categorical variable for the level of education associated with the mayors’ occupation, which is the 
only available data. More specifically, we create three dummies: the first (High_education) for jobs that surely require 
a higher level of education (e.g. physician), a second (Low_education) for jobs that do not require a degree (e.g. 
bricklayer) and, finally, a third (Unknown_education) for jobs that might require a higher level of education (e.g., 
public servant). We also have data on the mayor's gender; however, we do not use this variable due to lack of 
variability (97% of all observations are "male"). 
20 Data on resident population are available only for the years of the census (1981, 1991, 2001, 2011). In the other 
years, we considered the estimates of resident population elaborated by the INE.   
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The evidence on the impact of demographic variables on reelection is not clear. In Sakurai and 
Menezes-Filho (2008), the only significant one is resident population, with a positive effect. Castro 
and Martins (2011) find that mayors of municipalities with larger population are more likely to run 
for another term in office. 
We use the variable “DependencyRatio” to control for the political preferences of the population, 
which are age-related, and it also captures some aspects of the policy context of the municipality.  
Finally, the group of economic variables captures the economic context and living standards of 
the municipalities. Veiga and Veiga (2007) provide weak evidence that the positive variation of the 
purchasing power index, over the election term, increases the percentage of votes of the incumbent 
mayor. Similarly, Castro and Martins (2011) finds that the growth of this index leads to an increase 
in the probability for a mayor to run for another term.
21
       
We also consider two fiscal variables: “IMIshare” and “Investmentshare”.
22
  
“IMIshare” captures two effects. On the one hand, it is used as a measure of the degree of fiscal 
autonomy. On the other hand, “IMIshare” is likely to reflect the opportunistic behavior of mayors in 
the election periods. Indeed, the mayor may decrease local taxes in order to improve her probability 
of reelection. Pursuing the same objective, the mayor might also increase expenditures, in particular 
capital expenditures, which is why we use “Investmentshare”. Hence, the regression might suffer 
from a problem of endogeneity. In order to address the endogeneity of the model, it has been 
decided to use lagged values for the two variables.
23
 We also resort to an instrumental variable 
approach for robustness purpose, using as instrument for “IMIshare” the number of licensed 
buildings for construction.     
                                                             
21
 PPI is the municipality’s purchasing power relative to the country average (set equal to 100). We have no GDP data 
at the municipal level, so we use this synthetic index PPI and unemployment rate as alternative measures. 
22 Data have been taken from the website of the DGAL for the period 2003-2012, while they have been copied out 
from the books of the DGAL for the previous time periods. 




The other economic variables have been inserted in the regression in order to control for the 
mayor’s economic performance in the previous periods and for the other specificities of the 
municipalities that do not remain constant over time.      
Unfortunately, no data is available to measure the outcomes of local government’ competencies; 
the regressors above are intended as proxies. Still, the absence of more appropriate measures of the 
mayor’s performance raises the need of further data collection.   
5. Estimation results 
The estimation results are reported in the following table. T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses and the level of statistical significance is signaled with asterisks (
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Reelection Reelection Reelection Reelection Reelection Reelection 
       L.IMIshare   -4.729 -1.739 -0.567 -0.574 
   (-1.42) (-0.78) (-0.16) (-0.17) 
       L.Investmentshare   1.163 2.468** 0.835 0.826 
   (1.67) (3.21) (0.80) (0.79) 
       VoteShareprevious 0.0569*** 0.0544*** 0.0586*** 0.0606*** 0.0708*** 0.0703*** 
 (7.93) (7.29) (6.42) (5.55) (4.16) (4.10) 
       Left 0.295 0.162 0.485** -0.319 0.0885 0.0763 
 (1.90) (1.02) (2.62) (-1.27) (0.21) (0.18) 
       SamePolParty -0.510*** -0.506*** -0.674*** -0.0864 0.00906 0.0148 
 (-4.06) (-3.91) (-4.53) (-0.36) (0.02) (0.04) 
       Mandateprevious -0.712*** -0.630*** -0.729*** -0.173*** -0.119 -0.120 
 (-13.45) (-11.18) (-10.72) (-3.42) (-1.63) (-1.63) 
       AbstentionRate    0.0462*** 0.0731*** 0.0751*** 
    (3.44) (3.35) (3.42) 
       Age  -0.0492*** -0.0507*** -0.0502*** -0.0369* -0.0366* 
  (-6.06) (-4.99) (-4.21) (-2.03) (-2.01) 
       High_education 0.284* 0.128 0.0486 0.116 -0.0784 -0.0824 
 (1.99) (0.86) (0.28) (0.67) (-0.28) (-0.29) 
       Low_education 0.104 0.141 0.0642 0.284 -0.286 -0.288 
 (0.46) (0.60) (0.22) (0.99) (-0.61) (-0.61) 
              Residency     -0.0867 -0.0839 
     (-0.36) (-0.34) 
       LnResidentPopulation 0.454 0.459 0.0776 -0.0453 0.107 0.0966 
 (0.82) (0.80) (0.10) (-0.37) (0.52) (0.46) 
       DependencyRatio    -0.0131 0.0112 0.0115 
    (-1.37) (0.74) (0.76) 
       DeltaPPI    0.594   
    (0.96)   
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                     Grossenrolratesec     -0.00393* -0.00386 
     (-2.01) (-1.95) 
              UnemploymentRate     0.0853 0.0863 
     (1.60) (1.61) 
              Artgalleriesbyinh     1.699 1.717 
     (1.13) (1.14) 
       L.TaxrateNonReevaluated      0.358 
      (0.25) 
       N 2193 2133 1631 1005 470 470 
Time Period 1979-2009 1979-2009 1981-2009 1997-2009 2005-2009 2005-2009 
N.elections 9 9 7 4 2 2 
Fixed effects Y Y Y N N N 
Random effects N N N Y Y Y 
Time fixed effect Y Y Y Y N N 
 
 The first and the second columns report the regressions for the whole period, the third for the 
period 1981-2009
24
, the fourth corresponds to the regression for the intermediate time span and the 
last two report the regressions for the smallest time window. As expected, the level of significance 
of most of the regressors decreases when a more restricted time horizon is taken into account.   
Political variables are all significant and the expected signs obtain. The percentage of votes in 
the previous election has a positive and statistically significant impact on mayor’s reelection. This 
result, that holds under all the specifications, incorporates the effect of “persistence of vote share” 
found by Veiga and Veiga (2007). There is also evidence of erosion of support with time as, 
consistently with the expectations, the number of the mayor’s consecutive mandates significantly 
decreases her probability of reelection. The estimated effect of the dummy “Left” is positive 
although not highly significant. Belonging to the same political party of the central government has 
a negative impact on reelection prospects (the estimated effect is statistically significant only for the 
regression considering the largest time span). Finally, abstention rate positively affects the mayor’s 
probability of reelection. The estimate is highly significant under all specifications and the sign is 
consistent with the expected result.  
                                                             
24
 Data on “IMIshare” and “Investmentshare” are not available for the years 1978 and 1984.  
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Regarding the mayor’s characteristics, age significantly and negatively affects reelection, 
consistently with the finding that the incumbent’s support and probability to run for another term 
decrease with time. “High_education” has a positive and significant impact on reelection prospects 
(the level of significance decreases when we consider the smaller time spans). Hence, “coeteris 
paribus”, mayors with a job that surely requires a degree are more likely to be reelected with respect 
to those that occupy a position that might or not require a high education level.  
Regarding the set of demographic indicators, the estimated effect of resident population, 
expressed in logarithmic terms, is positive, although not highly significant and negative in one 
specification. Therefore, we provide only weak evidence that the mayor is more likely to be 
reelected, “coeteris paribus”, in larger municipalities.  
We also obtain the result that gross enrolment rate for secondary education significantly and 
negatively affect reelection. Indeed, a higher level of education is likely to imply a deeper citizen’s 
awareness of the mayors’ performance and a larger voters’ involvement in political affairs.  
The other socioeconomic and demographic indicators, inserted only in the specifications for the 
restricted horizons, are not statistically significant. 
Finally, we examine the estimated impact of economic variables on reelection. In all the 
specifications, the variable “IMIshare”, inserted in lagged values, negatively affects mayor’s 
reelection (although the estimated impact is not statistically significant). As mentioned above, the 
negative effect of “IMIshare” on reelection prospects may capture the opportunistic behavior of 
mayors, that reduce taxes seeking reelection. However, the relative importance of this effect is 
minimized by the use of lagged values. Therefore, the negative estimated effect of the one period 
lagged “IMIshare” is likely to reflect the negative impact that a larger fiscal autonomy has on 
reelection prospects. In principle, the negative effect of “L.IMIshare” might also reflect the voters’ 
punishment of high taxes. To eliminate this possibility, we have controlled for the tax rate of non 
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re-evaluated urban properties (regression 6).
25
 Hence, “coeteris paribus”, a higher degree of fiscal 
autonomy leads to a higher political turnover.  
One period lagged “Investmentshare” has a positive impact on reelection (statistically 
significant in the specification for the intermediate time span). Therefore, a mayor of a municipality 
spending relatively more on investment is more likely to be reelected, keeping all other factors 
constant. Moreover, consistently with the findings in literature, good economic prospects as 
measured by the change in the purchasing power index have a positive impact on reelection 
prospects.  
Finally, we perform several robustness checks, in order to overcome potential limitations of our 
empirical strategy. First, we consider an alternative measure of reelection, defined as a dummy 
taking the value 1 if either the mayor was reelected or a candidate of the same party empowered as 
a mayor, and 0 otherwise, as in Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008).
26
 This specification allows to 
sort out one of the problems of the model: in the baseline specification we do not account for the 
decision of the outgoing mayor to run for another term in office (data on this information for the 
first election terms are not available). A positive performance of the outgoing mayor during her 
mandate is likely to be rewarded by the voters with the election of a candidate of the same political 
party, if the outgoing mayor decides not to run for the following term. The covariates in this 
alternative specification (regression 7, in the Appendix) have the same sign as in the original one 
(actually, their level of significance increases).        
A second robustness check uses the data on the candidates for the last three electoral years. The 
variable “Recandidate”, a dummy taking the value 1 if the mayor decided to run for the following 
term and 0 otherwise, was either set as the new dependent variable of the model or used as a 
                                                             
25 The same results hold also when considering the tax rate of reevaluated urban properties. Due to the lack of 
available data we have only used the tax rate in the regression with the smallest time span. 
26 Under this alternative specification, a higher number of municipalities is dropped from the sample because of all 
equal values of the dependent variables (30 municipalities are dropped for the largest time span). 
21 
 
dummy in the original specification. This second method is deemed to be more appropriate because 
under the first specification a problem of selection bias is likely to arise. 
Under this alternative (period 2001-2009, regression 8, in the Appendix), the regressors have 
qualitatively similar effects, apart from the variable “Investmentshare”. The two political variables 
“LeftMun” and “SamePolParty” maintain the signs they have in the regression for the restricted 
time horizon. The variable “Recandidate” has a highly significant and positive effect on reelection.  
This result can be interpreted as the candidate’s perception of her reelection chances being rather 
accurate. 
Another robustness check is performed in order to sort out the potential endogeneity problem 
that might arise when using the abstention rate at election year. We use abstention rate in previous 
election to address the potential endogeneity. In this regression (regression 9, in the Appendix), the 
covariates have the same sign as in the baseline specification. However, the positive effect of 
“L4.AbstentionRate” is not anymore statistically significant.  
6. Conclusions 
This Work Project investigates the determinants of mayor’s reelection using data on Portuguese 
elections in the 278 mainland municipalities for the period 1976-2009.  
Several specificities of the Portuguese context qualify the Portuguese municipal elections as an 
ideal laboratory of analysis for electoral outcomes and political business cycles. Our analysis is 
grounded in the literature that analyzes the determinants of electoral outcomes and the opportunistic 
behavior of mayors seeking reelection. 
Consistently with the main findings in literature, we provide evidence that political, economic and 
demographic variables have an explanatory power on the probability for the outgoing mayor to be 
reelected. Mayors’ individual characteristics, such as age and level of education, also contribute to 
explain reelection prospects.  
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In particular, the obtained results confirm persistence of vote shares and cost of ruling or erosion of 
support with time; they also provide evidence of the role played on electoral outcomes by an active 
citizens’ involvement in political affairs.   
Moreover, good economic prospects are found to positively affect reelection and mayors of 
municipalities with relatively high expenditures on investments are more likely to be reelected. We 
also provide weak evidence that a larger fiscal autonomy is likely to increase political turnover.  
Finally, we find that the citizen’s level of education, as proxied by the gross enrolment rate for 
secondary education, enhances political competition and that mayors of larger municipalities are 
more likely to be reelected.   
One major problem of the model is the limited availability of economic and demographic indicators 
for the whole period under analysis. Specifically, the lack of data measuring local government’s 
competencies bring out the need of further data collection and induce to carry out further studies on 
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Graph 1: Box Plots of the number of consecutive mandates at election years. The graph displays the distribution of data based on 5 
number summary: lower adjacent value, 25th percentile (lower hinge), median, 75th percentile (upper hinge), upper 
adjacent value. Source: own elaboration from the data provided by the Comissão Nacional de Eleições (CNE). 
 
Other Political Parties 
Other registered parties are: Partido Comunista Português (PCP), Bloco de Esquerda (B.E.), Partido Popular 
(CDS/PP), Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (PCTP/MRPP), Partido Popular Monárquico (PPM), 
Partido Operário de Unidade Socialista (POUS), Partido Democrático do Atlântico (PDA), Partido Ecologista "Os 
Verdes" (PEV), Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR), Partido da Terra (MPT), Partido Humanista (P.H.), Nova 
Democracia (PND), Partido Liberal Democrata (PLD), Partido Trabalhista Português (PTP), Portugal pro Vida (PPV), 
Partido pelos Animais e pela Natureza (PAN), Movimento alternativa Socialista (MAS), Livre (L). Several of these are 
fairly recent, and some parties appeared and disappeared during the analysed period (e.g. PRD – Partido Renovador 
Democrático). None of them has, however, any local expression. The graph below shows the proportion of Portuguese 





Graph: Proportion of municipalities governed by left wing parties (PS, PCP-PEV, APU, FEPU, BE, UDP, PCTP/MRPP). Source: 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Reelection Reelection Reelection Reelection 
D_Year4 -2.063*** -2.088***   
 (-7.69) (-7.30)   
     D_Year7 -1.589*** -1.829*** -2.475***  
 (-6.45) (-7.16) (-6.25)  
     D_Year10 -1.144*** -1.361***   
 (-4.96) (-5.68)   
     D_Year14 -1.144*** -1.169*** -1.464***  
 (-4.96) (-5.17) (-4.81)  
     D_Year18 -0.992*** -1.199*** -1.667***  
 (-4.49) (-5.30) (-5.53)  
     D_Year22 -0.739*** -0.883*** -1.255*** -0.919*** 
 (-3.35) (-3.91) (-4.64) (-3.50) 
     D_Year26 -0.624** -0.717** -1.115*** -0.864** 
 (-2.82) (-3.18) (-4.14) (-3.22) 
     D_Year30 -0.0828 -0.145 -0.403 -0.121 
 (-0.37) (-0.65) (-1.62) (-0.51) 
Table: Estimates and significance of the year dummies used to control for time fixed effects in the regressions 1, 2, 3 and 4 reported 




















 (7) (8) (9) 
 Reelection Reelectionorelectsameparty Reelection 
    Recandidate 7.361***   
 (7.00)   
    L.IMIshare -4.000 -0.119 -0.561 
 (-1.18) (-0.03) (-0.25) 
    L.Investmentshare 0.865 2.211** 2.538*** 
 (0.85) (2.80) (3.33) 
    VoteShareprevious 0.0943*** 0.0647*** 0.0637*** 
 (5.22) (6.37) (5.86) 
    LeftMun -0.694 0.644*** -0.145 
 (-1.75) (3.39) (-0.58) 
    SamePolParty -0.104 -0.876*** -0.232 
 (-0.29) (-5.31) (-0.97) 
    Mandateprevious -0.129 -0.580*** -0.175*** 
 (-1.65) (-8.60) (-3.49) 
    AbstentionRate 0.0760***  0.352 
 (3.65)  (0.58) 
    L4.AbstentionRate   0.0140 
   (0.99) 
    DependencyRatio 0.0116  -0.0126 
 (0.74)  (-1.32) 
    Age -0.0405*  -0.0495*** 
 (-2.20)  (-4.18) 
        High_education -0.0196 0.135 0.0504 
 (-0.07) (0.71) (0.29) 
    Low_education 0.103 0.133 0.264 
 (0.24) (0.39) (0.92) 
        LnResidentPopulation 0.170  0.0531 
 (0.89)  (0.43) 
    
DeltaPPI 0.999  0.352 
 (0.88)  (0.58) 
    
D_Year7  -1.840***  
  (-4.19)  
    
D_Year14  -1.342***  
  (-4.14)  
    
D_Year18  -0.961**  
  (-3.03)  
    
D_Year22  -0.743* -0.906*** 
  (-2.51) (-3.46) 
    
D_Year26  -1.014*** -0.912*** 
  (-3.42) (-3.40) 
    
D_Year30  -0.240 -0.175 
  (-0.82) (-0.73) 
    
_cons -12.26***  0.177 
 (-4.16)  (0.11) 
lnsig2u    
_cons -11.89  -11.48 
 (-0.57)  (-0.43) 
N 923 1326 1004 
Time Period 2001-2009 1981-2009 1997-2009 
N.elections 3 7 4 
Fixed effects N Y N 
Random effects Y N Y 
Table: Regressions run for robustness purposes. In regression 7, we use the variable Recandidate as regressor of the model. In 
regression 8, we define the dependent variable as a dummy taking the value 1 if either the mayor was reelected or a candidate 
of the same party empowered as a mayor, and 0 otherwise. In regression 9, we use lagged abstention rate in order to address 
the potential endogeneity that may arise when abstention rate at the election year is taken into account.  
